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Bates: The forensic Digital Search of Cell phones at the Border in the U

THE FORENSIC DIGITAL SEARCH OF CELL PHONES AT
THE BORDER IN UNITED STATES V. KOLSUZ: TOUGH ON
TERRORISM OR TOUGH ON PETTY CRIME?
BY: JILLIAN A. BATES
INTRODUCTION
Modern cell phones are no longer just communication devices. For many,
they are extensions of their daily lives. Modern cell phones have the
Sd,dcIEI(_ (- MEPd*/7 (KP ,d*(IS'Ed*) -N I() ')P*, I/SE'RI/L (KP ,EdSP) (KP ')P*
*PL'Ed*E_ &I)I(), (KP ')P*’) ,-EI(ISdE EPd/I/L), d/R RP(dIE) -N (KP ')P*’) )-SIdE,
familial, and professional life. T-Rd_, I/(I0d(P RP(dIE) -N d ,P*)-/’) ,*I&d(P
life are stored on a cell phone. Specific functions and social expectations have
been created to protect this private information. It is a commonly accepted
)-SIdE )(d/Rd*R (Kd( )S*-EEI/L (K*-'LK (KP S-/(P/( -N d/-(KP*’) SPEE ,K-/P
without permission constitutes an invasion of privacy. However, this same
privacy does not apply to the government as long as the person is walking
through customs before or after an international flight. According to a ruling
issued by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018, government agents at
I/(P*/d(I-/dE dI*,-*() Kd&P (KP *ILK( (- S-/NI)Sd(P d ,P*)-/’) SPEE ,K-/P d/R
conduct a forensic digital )Pd*SK -N dEE (KP Rd(d )(-*PR -/ (KP ,P*)-/’) SPEE
phone as long as they have a reason to suspect that a crime may have been
committed.1 In short, passcodes and social norms cannot withstand the reach
of the United States government as long as government agents reasonably
suspect the person of committing a crime. In this note, I will address the
Y-'*(K !I*S'I(’) NdIE'*P (- S-/)IRP* EI0I(d(I-/) -/ (KP )S-,P -N (KP N-*P/)IS
)Pd*SK -N I/RI&IR'dE’) SPEE ,K-/P) d) I( *PEd(P) (- 0I/-* S*I0P) d( I/(P*/d(I-/dE
airports, in United States v. Kolsuz. I will also address the implications of
such intrusive searches as they relate to government overreach in the policing
of minor crimes as well as the vulnerable communities that will most likely
be disproportionately affected by these intrusive searches.

1. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146-47 (4th Cir. 2018), as amended (May 18, 2018).
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THE CASE
In December 2012, Hamza Kolsuz arrived at John F. Kennedy
International Airport (JFK) in New York for a flight to Turkey. 2 At check in,
customs agents discovered 163 firearms parts, listed on the United States
Munitions List (USML), in his luggage. 3 Agents explained to Kolsuz that he
was required to have a specific export license in order to carry the items onto
his international flight, and subsequently seized the weapons parts. 4 In
January 2013, Kolsuz, again, attempted to carry weapons parts listed on the
USML on an international flight from JFK to Turkey without the requisite
export license.5 As a consequence, the weapons were seized. 6 On February
1, 2016, a Special Agent with United States Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) in New York discovered that Kolsuz had again entered the country
and had an upcoming flight from Washington Dulles International Airport
(Dulles) to Turkey. 7 The CBP Officer proceeded to inform other CBP
-NNISP*) d( D'EEP) -N U-E)'^’) NEILK( as well as his history of attempting to
smuggle weapons parts out of the country illegally. 8 4,-/ U-E)'^’) d**I&dE
at Dulles, CBP officers searched his checked bags and found multiple
firearms parts listed on the USML. 9 Before boarding his flight, Kolsuz was
stopped and transported to a secondary inspection area. 10 There, the officers
discovered that he had no active or pending export license and initiated two
searches of his iPhone. 11 The first search was a manual search, where agents
manually scrolled through his recent calls and text messages. 12 Following an
interview with CBP officers Kolsuz was arrested. 13 The officers then
(*d/),-*(PR U-E)'^’) I:K-/P (- d W-0PEd/R 8PS'*I(_ I/&P)(ILd(I-/ -NNISP d/R
conducted a forensic search of his cell phone. 14 Data was extracted from the
cell phone itself using a Cellebrite Physical Analyzer. 15 This process lasted
for a month and resulted in a report including information regarding
MU-E)'^’) S-/(dS( EI)(), P0dIE), 0P))P/LP* S-/&P*)d(I-/), ,K-(-L*d,K),
videos, calendar, web c*-b)I/L KI)(-*_,7 SdEE E-L), d/R X:8 S--*RI/d(P) -N
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 138-39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 138-39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 138-39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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his past physical locations. 16 This information made up a 896-page report.17
Ultimately, Kolsuz was indicted for attempting to export firearms parts on
the USML without a license, attempting to smuggle goods from the United
States, and conspiracy. 18
Kolsuz made a pre-trial motion to suppress the report that was generated
following the forensic search of his cell phone. 19 He contended that a monthlong forensic search of his phone at a location situated miles away from the
I/(P*/d(I-/dE dI*,-*( N-EE-bI/L KI) d**P)( M)K-'ER cP (*Pd(PR d) d )Pd*SK
I/SIRP/( (- KI) d**P)(,7 *d(KP* (Kd/ )'cGPS( (- (KP c-*RP* )Pd*SK P`SP,(I-/. 20 In
addition, he contended that, under Riley v. California, MSPEE ,K-/P) 0d_ cP
searched inSIRP/( (- d/ d**P)( -/E_ bI(K d bd**d/( cd)PR -/ ,*-cdcEP Sd')P.7 21
6KP RI)(*IS( S-'*( RP/IPR U-E)'^’) 0-(I-/ (- )',,*P)) d/R KPER (Kd( (KP )Pd*SK
following his arrest constituted a border search, based on the finding that
prior to the forensic search, neither made that search incidental to his arrest
nor rendered the border exception inapplicable. 22 Moreover, the court held
that a search that is initiated at the border is subject to the border exception
regardless of whether it was conducted off-site and for a long period of
time.23 6K'), (KP 0d/'dE )Pd*SK -N U-E)'^’) I:K-/P bd) d *-'(I/P c-*RP*
search, requiring no warrant; and the off-)I(P N-*P/)IS )Pd*SK -N U-E)'^’)
iPhone was a nonroutine border search, which required only reasonable
suspicion.24 Ultimately, the court rejected the finding in Riley.25 Kolsuz
d,,PdEPR (KP RI)(*IS( S-'*(’) NI/RI/L (- (KP 4/I(PR 8(d(P) !-'*( -N A,,PdE) N-*
the Fourth Circuit. 26 6KI) S-'*( dNNI*0PR (KP RI)(*IS( S-'*(’) RPSI)I-/, d/R KPER
(Kd( (KP N-*P/)IS )Pd*SK -N U-E)'^’) ,K-/P, and the subsequent invasion of
U-E)'^’) ,*I&dS_, bd) G')(INIPR '/RP* (KP c-*RP* )Pd*SK P`SP,(I-/ cPSd')P
there was sufficient evidence for the officers to establish reasonable
suspicion that Kolsuz was actively engaging in an ongoing crime and
possible conspiracy.27

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 138-39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
890 F.3d at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148.
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BACKGROUND
6KP Y-'*(K A0P/R0P/( ,*-&IRP) I/RI&IR'dE) bI(K (KP *ILK( M(- cP )PS'*P
in their persons, houses, paper, and effects against unreasonable searches and
)PI^'*P)7 dc)P/( d bd**d/( d/R ,*-cdcEP Sd')P. 28 However, border searches
are an exception to this requirement. 29 The border search exception applies
R'*I/L d/ I/RI&IR'dE’) P/(*d/SP d/R P`I( -N (KP S-'/(*_ c_ bd_ -N d/
I/(P*/d(I-/dE c-*RP* -* I() MN'/S(I-/dE P+'I&dEP/(,7 )'SK d) d/ I/(P*/d(I-/dE
airport.30 There are two types of border searches, routine and nonroutine.31
D'*I/L d *-'(I/P c-*RP* )Pd*SK ML-&P*/0P/( dLP/() 0d_ S-/R'S( )Pd*SKP) -N
I/RI&IR'dE)’ ,P*)-/ -* ,*-,P*(_ dc)P/( d/_ bd**d/( -* EP&PE -N I/RI&IR'dE
)'),ISI-/.7 32 Routine searches of electronic devices, such as cell phones,
I/&-E&P d M0d/'dE I/),PS(I-/,7 where government agents may assess the
S-/(P/() -N d/ I/RI&IR'dE’) SPEE ,K-/P MI/ (KP )d0P 0d//P* d) d (_,ISdE
')P*.733 6KI) I/SE'RP) ')I/L (KP ,K-/P’) (-'SK )S*PP/ N'/S(I-/ (- &IPb )(-*PR
text messages and phone calls.34 A nonroutine border search is more intrusive
than a routine search. 35 In United States v. Saboonchi, the Fourth Circuit held
that the digital forensic search of a cell phone is a non-routine search. 36 A
forensic digital search is typically where officers conduct a detailed review
of the data s(-*PR I/ d/ I/RI&IR'dE’) SPEE'Ed* RP&ISP ')I/L d ),PSIdE process.37
Courts have referred to these digital forensic searches as body cavity searches
of an electronic device. 38 In order to perform a nonroutine border search,
government agents are required to first have reasonable or individualized
suspicion.39 This means that agents must have Md ,d*(IS'Ed*I^PR d/R -cGPS(I&P
cd)I) N-* )'),PS(I/L (KP ,d*(IS'Ed* ,P*)-/ )(-,,PR -N S*I0I/dE dS(I&I(_.7 40 This
reasonable suspicion standard was questioned in Riley v. California.41 In that
Sd)P, (KP S-'*( KPER (Kd(, R'P (- 0-RP*/ SPEE ,K-/P)’ I00P/)P )(-*dLP
Sd,dSI(_, (KP )Pd*SK -N d ,P*)-/’) SPEE ,K-/P N-EE-bI/L (KPI* d**P)( )K-'ER cP
28. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29. United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 850-51 (E.D. Va. 2016), aff’d, 890 F.3d 133 (4th
Cir. 2018), as amended (May 18, 2018).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 852.
33. Id. at 854. (citing United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.2005)).
34. 185 F. Supp. 33d at 854.
35. Id. at 853.
36. Id. at 854. (citing United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F.Supp.2d 536, 569 (D.Md.2014)).
37. 185 F. Supp. 33d at 854.
38. Id. at 854. (citing United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp.2d 536, 560 (D. Md. 2014)).
39. 185 F. Supp. 33d at 854.
40. Id. at 859. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d
621 (1981)).
41. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014).
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subject to a warrant and probable cause, as provided by the Fourth
Amendment.42
ANALYSIS
The purpose of the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment is to
dEE-b (KP L-&P*/0P/(’) I/(P*P)( I/ /d(I-/dE )PS'*I(_, (*d/)/d(I-/dE )PS'*I(_,
and export control to govern at its international border. 43 It is appropriate that
the government have strict rules and absolute power over international
borders. The government has every right to protect its interest at its borders,
which include protecting its citizens from terrorist attacks like those on
September 11, and the Orlando nightclub shooting. However, when
government agents at the border are faced with arguably minor, petty crimes,
I) I( *Pd)-/dcEP (- ')P P`,P/)I&P *P)-'*SP) (- &I-Ed(P I/RI&IR'dE)’ ,*I&dS_ bI(K
(KP EI0I(EP)) d/R I/(*')I&P N-*P/)IS Rd(d )Pd*SK -N d )'),PS(’) SPEE ,K-/P# I/
Kolsuz, the court failed to address whether searches should be more narrowly
tailored when government agents are confronted with individuals who may
have committed minor crimes at international airports. 44 The limitless
N-*P/)IS )Pd*SK -N d ,P*)-/’) SPEE ,K-/P I) -nly justifiable, under the purpose
of the border search exception, when it is used to prevent real threats of major
crimes, such as threats of terrorism, and conspiracies to flood countries with
dangerous drugs, firearms or other illegal contraband, like in Kolsuz. On a
)0dEEP* )SdEP, (KP N-*P/)IS Rd(d )Pd*SK -N d/ I/RI&IR'dE’) SPEE ,K-/P I) /-( d
justifiable approach to securing international borders. Instead, these
unfettered forensic searches of cellular devices at the border subject
I/RI&IR'dE)’ '/*PEd(ed personal information to overexposure; and also subject
commonly marginalized groups that regularly face racial and religious
profiling to a greater likelihood of violations of their privacy rights while at
international airports.
I. THE OVEREXPOSURE OF UNRELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION.
Although, nonroutine border searches are exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures absent
a warrant, the exception should be subject to certain limitations based on the
nature of the alleged crime. In the event that government agents at
42. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 851. (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430
(2014)).
43. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 143-44.
44. Id. d( D@Z ]2IEFI/)-/, J., S-/S'**I/L\ ]M2P Kd&P /- IRPd (KP Rd/LP*) we are courting. Thousands
of travelers go through [border posts] every day. Yet the majority hardly grapples with how law
P/N-*SP0P/( I) P`,PS(PR (- d)SP*(dI/ I/RI&IR'dEI^PR )'),ISI-/ bKP/ RPdEI/L bI(K )'SK /'0cP*).7\.
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international airports find it reasonable to suspect a person of committing a
minor crime, such as stowing a small amount of weed in their luggage prior
to their flight abroad, there should be specific limitations on how extensive a
forensic data search of their phone, if one is conducted, is permitted to be. In
Kolsuz, the court did not consider the possibility of a forensic data search of
d ,P*)-/’) SPEE ,K-/P dN(P* (KP_ KdR cPP/ )'),PS(PR -N committing a minor
crime.45 Instead, it only considered forensic data searches as they applied to
major crimes that involved export control and possible security interests
abroad.46 6KP S-'*(’) NdIE'*P (- RI)(I/L'I)K cP(bPP/ (KP (*Pd(0P/( -N 0dG-*
and minor crimes permits the potential for a deeply intrusive level of search
that may not be warranted depending upon the crime suspected.
Moreover, this has the potential to subject an individual to a search that
may easily stray from the original purpose or go beyond the border search
exception. In short, the search may become analogous to a fishing expedition.
As a result, the data stored in the cell phone of a suspect, who may be a
doctor, lawyer, or a fiduciary, may be that of another party. In turn, the search
d/R )PI^'*P -N (K-)P R-S'0P/() 0d_ &I-Ed(P (KP (KI*R ,d*(_’) Y-'*(K
Amendment rights, which were not originally subject to the border search
P`SP,(I-/, -* &I-Ed(P (KP (KI*R ,d*(_’) ,*I&dS_ -&P* (K-)P *PS-*R) (Kd( d*P
legally protected in their own right for the best interest of a third party patient
or client.
II. THE OVEREXPOSURE OF REGULARLY PROFILED GROUPS TO INTRUSIVE
SEARCHES.
This gap in the law also allows room for vulnerable groups of people who
are regularly profiled as violent or criminals in the United States to be more
EIFPE_ (- Kd&P (KPI* SPEE ,K-/P’) )'cGPS( (- d N-*P/)IS )Pd*SK d( (KP c-*RP*.
Due to past and recent instances of terrorism, both domestically and abroad,
the security at airports has become increasingly stricter. Much of the time,
these terrorist attacks have been orchestrated by religious extremist or their
sympathizers, who have commonly and unfairly been associated with people
of the Islamic faith as well as people of Middle Eastern descent. As a
consequence, innocent Muslims and people of Middle Eastern descent have
been stigmatized as terrorists or terrorist sympathizers and routinely face
racial or religious profiling, particularly at airports. In addition to the latter
mentioned groups, in the United States, people of color and immigrants also
face racial profiling as well as frequent suspicion of involvement in criminal
activity. These groups, which are already vulnerable to racial and religious
45. Id.
46. Id. at 143 (majority opinion) (court focused on the transnational offense).
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profiling as well as unfair association with minor crimes, will likely be the
demographics most frequently having their cell phones subjected to intrusive
forensic data searches at airports over suspicion of petty crime. Although,
officers are required to first satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard before
proceeding with a forensic search, there is evidence of many instances where
these marginalized groups have been singled out and assumed to be violent
or taking part in illegal activity based on their phenotype or obvious religious
associations, regardless of this standard. A couple of instances include, but
are not limited to, the senseless killings of people of color such as Philando
!d)(IEP, d/R :*P)IRP/( D-/dER 6*'0,’) )--SdEEPR MT')EI0 "d/7. 6KP)P
L*-',)’ SPEE ,K-/P) bIEE EIFPE_ cP )'cGPS( (- EI0I(EP)) )Pd*SKP) d) d *P)'E( -N
L-&P*/0P/( dLP/(’) )'),ISI-/ -N (KPI* I/&-E&P0P/( I/ 0I/-* S*I0P) d(
international airports. Ultimately, the Kolsuz S-'*(’) NdIE'*P (- 0P/(I-/ d/_
distinction between the extent of a forensic search in the case of the suspicion
of a minor crime versus a major crime leaves room for needlessly extensive
violations of privacy as well as prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Although the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment is
beneficial in that it secures the United States border for reasons of national
security and export control, it lacks specificity regarding the suspicion of
minor crimes. This allows for the overexposure of unrelated personal
I/N-*0d(I-/ &Id I/(*')I&P N-*P/)IS )Pd*SKP) -N I/RI&IR'dE)’ SPEE ,K-/P), d/R
the disproportionate subjection of vulnerable and marginalized groups in the
United States to these searches as well as additional discriminatory treatment
and more frequent exclusion from the privacy protection as promised under
the Fourth Amendment while at international airports. Exceptions without
reasonable limitations are dangerous, especially when the exception includes
governmental overreach into the immensely private lives of already
vulnerable demographics.
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